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PROFIT UNDER THE SOVIETS: TIMBER
CONCESSIONS, WESTERN INTERESTS AND
THE MONETARY REFORMS UNDER NEP
In 1921, at the beginning of the New Economic Policy (NEP), V.I. Lenin pointed to the timber
industry of the North as a promising opportunity for cooperation with Western interests and
the Soviet state soon introduced timber concessions. However, these concessions were not par-
ticularly profitable and ended up as a short-lived experiment. This article analyses why timber
concessions failed to make a profit, a critical question for the NEP’s semi-capitalist economy.
It finds that monetary reforms that began with the re-establishment of central banking in
October 1921 and ended in May 1924 with the new ruble clearly contributed to the failures
of the timber concessions. The relative stability of the new currency was seen as an important
achievement, but with the exchange rate initially fixed, the new ruble became overvalued.
Thus, the export of goods purchased in new rubles became less profitable, or simply unprofi-
table. This led to severe difficulties for timber concessions such as Russangloles, Russhollan-
doles and Russnorvegoles. We focus on the important Russnorvegoles concession. We also find
that there were two occasions when this concession succeeded in circumventing the problem of
the overvalued ruble for short periods, yet acting contrary to Soviet interests in this way con-
tributed to the end of Western interests in the company.
Keywords: Russian timber industry history; New Economic Policy (NEP); monetary
reform; currency regulation and control
Introduction
The Soviet government welcomed Western business interests in 1921 as part of the
New Economic Policy (NEP). The government offered concessions, contractual
arrangements by which Western parties were offered business rights in exchange for
specific obligations. These contractual arrangements had the character of state-
private partnerships that, under given conditions, granted privileges. Concessions
were often mixed; they were offered to companies formed in the West that were
jointly controlled by Western and Soviet interests. These concessions were important
in rebuilding the economy after the civil war and war communism. Our focus is on
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timber concessions. As Sune Jungar has observed, NEP timber concessions were not
profitable, but ‘[t]he circumstances behind the lack of profitability are less than
clear’.1 The aim of this article is to present an in-depth economic and financial analysis
of the profitability of timber concessions based on extensive archival research into the
1920s, when timber concessions played an important role in the Soviet economy. We
focus on the Russnorvegoles concession, which was an especially important timber
concession.2
In an address to the general assembly of the mixed timber concession holder Russ-
norvegoles, held in Oslo on 29 May 1925, managing director Frederik Prytz (1878–
1945) was clear that the lack of profitability after two years of operations was a critical
problem.3 Prytz stated that in 1924, the first full year of operation, costs of production
of what was shipped and sold were about 20 per cent above the proceeds from sales.
The managing director pointed out that the situation was such that the liquidation of
the company had to be considered. Moreover, liquidation was something that could be
forced upon them as banks, such as those in the City of London, were reluctant to offer
credit. It was said that the Western interests in Russangloles and Russhollandoles, two
other timber concession holders in the White Sea area with close ties to Russnorve-
goles, were in an even more precarious position as they had been in operation
longer than Russnorvegoles.
The report included a discussion of the factors that led to the disastrous lack of
profitability. Prytz was rather pessimistic about whether economic circumstances in
the future would bring about positive changes, believing that the Soviet authorities
had to change working conditions. He discussed the factors that drove down profits
such as less favourable sales prices in the West, insufficient productivity mixed with
high costs of operations, and the unfavourable exchange rate. Indeed, there were
only two occasions when Russnorvegoles was able to face, or get around, the low
profitability problem. First, when most of the output for the 1925–26 season was
sold for a higher profit on the Soviet home market. Second, when intricate currency
deals during the following season of 1926–27 allowed Russnorvegoles to prioritize the
export of timber. However, the currency deals were seen by the Soviet authorities as
contrary to their interests and were stopped in early 1928. The Western shares in
Russnorvegoles were then acquired by the Soviet state at an advantageous price. In
an almost impenetrable and highly complex manner, all this somehow contributed
to Prytz ending up as a wealthy man. He turned to politics and was able to establish
himself as a very prominent Norwegian Nazi. In Russia, with the definitive end of
timber concessions based on East–West partnerships, a new era started for the
timber industry.
This article analyses the factors contributing to the critical situation that faced
Russnorvegoles and other timber concessionaires. Despite achievements by the con-
cession companies in logging, floating, and after that producing and shipping sawn
goods, Russangloles and Russhollandoles stopped their operations shortly after the
navigation season of 1925.4 Russnorvegoles, though, continued for another two dra-
matic and chaotic years. A study of the Russnorvegoles concession therefore pro-
vides an important case study of Soviet–Western agreements during NEP since
timber concessions were vital to the Soviet economy and for East–West relations
during NEP.
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On timber concessions
At the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party on 8–16 March 1921, V.I.
Lenin officially introduced NEP. Foreign trade had declined after the October Revolu-
tion and throughout the civil war. NEP was supposed to stabilize the economy after the
exceptionally destabilizing economic situation brought about by war communism. The
prominent Bolshevik Leonid B. Krasin was appointed People’s Commissar for Trade
and Industry in late 1918 and became an important representative on Soviet missions
to the West.5 In the early years of NEP, the Soviet state needed foreign currency. It
focused on restarting exports and given the historical importance of timber it was
natural to look to the timber industry. Semen Lieberman played a central role in estab-
lishing timber concessions with foreigners. Under war communism, even though he
was not a Bolshevik, Lieberman became an influential timber expert who rose to pro-
minence because he was able to secure provisions of firewood. Without access to coal
from the Donbas, this was essential to keep the trains running. Krasin was also People’s
Commissar for Transport, and this brought him into contact with Lieberman. On 17
August 1921, Severoles (State Timber Trust of the Northern White Sea District) was
formed, with Lieberman as its managing director.6 Severoles was the first trust estab-
lished and it served as a model for the establishment of other state trusts later.
Severoles was permitted to enter into partnership with Western parties to form
mixed concession companies. Taking advantage of this, Russangloles was formed in
what was most likely the first mixed timber concession company.7 The London &
Northern Trading Co., controlled by the brothers Schalit, was the Western partner
of Russangloles.8 London & Northern had been formed on 20 September 1919 with
one million pounds in capital.9 Russhollandoles was then formed in the spring of
1922 with Altius & Co. of Amsterdam as the main Western party.10 The division of
ownership for Russangloles and Russhollandoles, as well as Russnorvegoles, was
divided equally between the Soviet state and the Western companies.
The third concession company, Russnorvegoles, is of particular interest in part
because of a rich source base that allows a fuller picture of its history. The Norwegian
officer and businessman, Prytz, played an important role in the history of Russnorve-
goles. Starting out in 1909, he established himself as a central figure in the timber
business of the White Sea region. He successfully built up the Russian-based Prytz
& Co. before the start of the First World War. On a visit back to Norway, he saw
the possibilities of making the company public could bring, given the booming Norwe-
gian stock market. In 1917, Prytz & Co. became the Norway-based Russian Forest
Industry (RFI). With Prytz as director, the company was successfully floated on the
stock exchange in April 1917. The prospects of the RFI were fundamentally altered
by the October Revolution. Under challenging circumstances, operations continued
until the company was finally nationalized in March 1920 after the Soviet regime
took over the North.11 Prytz then waited and observed. Central in working for Nor-
wegian interests in Russia, he was invited to take part as a Norwegian delegate at inter-
national conferences. Thus, Prytz was able to bring himself into contact with
prominent Soviet representatives, such as Krasin.12
In the summer of 1922, three Western stakeholders–Onega Wood Co. (later taken
over by Dutch Altius & Co.), Norwegian Bache & Vig/Bache & Wager, and the RFI–
combined their interests and established an understanding known as the Onega
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Combine.13 In autumn 1922, Lieberman and Prytz made contact, which led to a con-
tract for a concession in summer 1923.14 Russnorvegoles was formally established in
August as a Norwegian limited liability company with its constituent assembly and
head office in Kristiania (known officially as Oslo from 1 January 1925).15 Stipulated
in British pounds, the shareholders’ capital was set at 300,000 pounds. This capital was
provided in kind, in the form of previously nationalized stocks of timber, as well as the
plant, property, and equipment. Russnorvegoles rented the physical capital at quite
favourable terms of 0.5 per cent of proceeds from sales.16
The concession contract was for twenty years, which was common for the timber
industry. Initially it was thought that even this agreement could be extended. The
forests located in the River Onega Basin were an important part of the concessional
agreement. It included an area larger than Belgium, with about 70 per cent forestland.
Logs harvested were paid for according to a complex contractual scheme based on
stumpage fees. Russnorvegoles incurred the costs of logging and floating timber, and
operating sawmills in Onega and Shalakusha, in addition to costs associated with ship-
ping, taxation expenses, and similar charges.
Russnorvegoles did not have the necessary cash to start operations. Help came
from the merchant bankers Wm. Brandt’s Sons & Co of the City of London. As
revealed in documents from the Prytz Archive, there was close contact between
London & Northern and Russnorvegoles.17 Prytz established a City of London
bank contact based on an introduction to the Brandts by London & Northern that
also included a loan guarantee against commission.18 This, and the engagement of
Dutch Altius & Co. in Russnorvegoles, show that the Western interests behind
the mixed concession holders Russangloles, Russhollandoles and Russnorvegoles
were interrelated from the start. These concession holders, however, met working
conditions that were very different from those experienced before the Bolshevik
Revolution.
Sales prices in the West
Prytz was not lying when he told his shareholders in 1925 that the company suffered
from less favourable sales prices in the West. We have analysed the sales prices of
imported sawn goods on the important British market.19 This provides a fairly clear
reflection of prices that could be asked on other European markets. Material from
the British Forestry Commission, reported in loads of 50 cubic feet, presents sums
of sawn softwood volumes from 1920 to 1929. In addition, we have the corresponding
pound values for these load volumes. In dividing pound values by volumes, we obtain
price series in decimal pounds per load. However, a more common timber measure
Table 1. Pound sterling per one St Petersburg standard, British current and price level adjusted
timber prices in the 1920s.
1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929
Current prices 38.55 21.74 17.28 18.80 17.64 16.06 15.16 15.46 15.36 15.02
Constant 1910 prices 14.93 9.22 8.51 9.85 9.30 8.46 8.03 8.42 8.36 8.27
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was St Petersburg standards. Multiplying loads by 3.3 gives measurements in St Peters-
burg standards with one standard equal to 4.672 cubic metres.20 The first row of
Table 1 shows the timber prices that came out of our re-calculations:
This corresponds reasonably well with the picture for 1921–25 reported by Prytz.
Based on what came after 1925, Prytz was right to be pessimistic.21 The bottom row of
Table 1 shows recalculated prices if overall prices had been constant. Prytz refers to a
pre-war price of 10 pounds per standard. Our 1920s timber prices are re-calculated
given the British level of overall prices as registered before the First World War. To
be more specific, this refers to 1910 overall prices and re-calculations are based on
price index series published by the House of Commons Library.22 Figure 1 presents
our results graphically.
Figure 1 shows that soon after a short post-war boom came a lasting downturn.
In both current and constant price figures, this is also what is seen in Table 1. Most
interestingly, we are able to document that international timber prices during most
of the 1920s were well below what they were before the First World War. For
sellers of timber and sawn goods such as Russnorvegoles, this decline led to
prices that were considerably less favourable than before the war. As we will see,
after 1924 and the currency reform, prices approaching 8 pounds in pre-war
money became untenable.
Costs of operating in the Soviet Union
Representatives of the non-Russian shareholders of Russangloles, Russhollandoles and
Russnorvegoles raised the problem of the unprofitability of their venture in a letter to
Krasin on 19 May 1925, believing that he still had the standing he had before NEP.23
However, under NEP, the Main Concession Committee became the organ that formally
oversaw the concessions and Krasin was sidelined.24 Not long after meeting Krasin
FIGURE 1. Prices in the 1920s of UK imported sawn goods. Observed current prices in pounds are
re-calculated and presented in real terms relative to a pre-First World War price of 10 pounds per
standard.
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Russangloles and Russhollandoles gave up. The Western interests of the two companies
were sold to Severoles at about 20 per cent of their nominal values.25 This meant that
Russnorvegoles was alone in facing the Main Concession Committee.
In Prytz’s 1925 report and in the letter to Krasin, the non-Russian interests pre-
sented an overly vague picture of the costs in rubles of operating in the Soviet Union.
Most importantly, the lamentation in the letter to Krasin over high costs was not docu-
mented with figures. One important indication of operations can be found in wages
paid in rubles. This is a meaningful approximation for industries that were clearly
labour intensive, such as the timber industry. Based on the work of S. Zagorsky of
the International Labour Office, it is possible to find nominal wages after 1923–24
in the new chervonets rubles. Zagorsky’s work is based on material cast in year-long
periods that differ from calendar years. That is what often is referrred to as fiscal
years. Figure 2 presents the period when Western interests were engaged in Russnor-
vegoles and the nominal daily wages.26
The increase in nominal wages was considerable. If a worker received 100 rubles in
1923-24, this wage increased to 167 by 1927–28, an average jump of just over 13 per
cent per year. This increase varied from year to year and was particularly evident from
1924–25 to 1925–26 at almost 28 per cent. Increasing productivity, an important
factor particularly during the first years of NEP, helped to neutralize increased costs
from wages. However, as Zagorsky and others have noted, the race between pro-
ductivity and nominal wages did not end up favourably for the concessions group.
Nominal wages had a tendency to leap ahead of savings from increased productivity
with inflationary pressure as a result, and from 1924–25 to 1925–26 this was
clearly a problem.
It was important for concession companies active in the Soviet Union to be able to
control their own productivity to cope with the increase in nominal wages. The 1925
report by Prytz focused on productivity and overall costs. First, he observed that
‘[w]hen we took over the administration in Onega, the production was in a very unsa-
tisfactory state’.27 He pointed out that 18 months after the takeover, Russnorvegoles
was able to reduce the number of workers at the mills from 1,955 to 1,307, a fall of
FIGURE 2. Nominal daily wages in the Timber Industry in new Soviet rubles, 1923–28.
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33.15 per cent. Reductions were of the same magnitude in other divisions of the
company. The high production costs in 1924, 20 per cent higher than the proceeds
from sales, may well have been a result of the slow process of implementing the
improvements in productivity pointed to by Prytz. In any case, the positive effects
of these changes must have been offset by reductions in the sales price and increased
costs of production. As seen in Figure 1, from 1924 to 1925 the sales price declined
about 9 per cent and, as seen in in Figure 2, wages as an indicator of costs of production
went up 8.43 per cent from 1923–24 to 1924–25. The navigation season of 1925 could
not have ended much better than the depressing results for the navigation season of
1924.
Trapped in a financial crunch
As we have seen, the mixed timber concessions established at the beginning of NEP
were soon in serious financial straits. Soviet monetary reforms established a fixed
exchange rate that led to economic difficulties for exporters like the timber conces-
sions. Financially, they were trapped in a crunch between low sale prices and
expensive rubles. Russangloles and Russhollandoles gave up after three or four navi-
gation seasons (that is, 1922, 1923, 1924 and 1925).28 The exchange rate of the
new currency, which had been fixed at the beginning of the monetary reform
process and before the new currency was released into the economy, squeezed
the concession groups. The monetary reform was an important element of NEP
and aimed to restore sound monetary conditions, including a freely convertible cur-
rency. The English and Dutch concession holders most likely gave up because they
saw the difficulties associated with the monetary reform as something that would
endure.
When commenting on the difficult situation of Russnorvegoles, the managing
director pointed out that ‘[the] chance of obtaining financial assistance in London
for the continuation of our operations in Russia will be a very remote one’,29 refer-
ring to the essential short-term financing of working capital needed to keep the pro-
duction cycle going. It may well also have been the case that Russangloles and
Russhollandoles were simply forced to give up because they had been unable to
get this kind of necessary short-term financial assistance in 1925. This did prove
to be the case for Russnorvegoles, which was denied credit in the City of London.
Facing the navigation season of 1926, however, they were able to find ways and
means around this problem.
Russnorvegoles was able to carry on for another two years. As an immediate
measure, sales were redirected toward the Soviet market.30 Sales were now in
rubles, which meant that the company avoided the unfavourable exchange from
pounds to rubles and obtained better prices for sawn goods.31 Moreover, in contrast
to the actions of Russangloles and Russhollandoles, Russnorvegoles kept afloat by
taking on the difficult task of confronting the Soviet authorities on the issue of negative
profitability. Russnorvegoles engaged in direct communication with the Soviet Main
Concession Committee about working conditions. After lengthy negotiations, it had
only moderate success.32 Next, it was important for Russnorvegoles that the unregu-
lated exchange of the new ruble did not last. A Soviet decree on 9 July 1926 banned the
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export of rubles and restricted the free exchange of foreign currency, such as the pur-
chase of pounds against rubles. In complex ways, this affected Russnorvegoles. Next,
we will take a closer look at the monetary reform process that ended in May 1924. This
reform was not without flaws, as the1926 ban on exports points to. However, as a
regulatory currency regime, the ban was insufficient and this was something that
Western parties involved in Russnorvegoles were able to take advantage of. In the
two next sections, our focus is on currency problems more generally. After that, we
will go deeper into the profitable currency deals that the ban made possible.
Monetary reform and the purchasing power of the chervonets
In the letter to Krasin referred to above, the authors pointed to ‘[t]he high rate of
exchange of the Tchervonetz [chervonets], which is not in any reasonable proportion
to the purchasing power of the Tchervonetz in Russia’.33 This contributed to the
high cost of production for exporters that was felt in British pounds. Or, to express
it another way, it meant that exporters got less back in rubles for revenues in
pounds as compared to what would have been the case with a lower rate of exchange.
This problem was a result of how the Soviet authorities tackled the stabilization of the
country’s currency as they implemented NEP. It was essential to bring an end to the
notoriously inflationary sovznaks, the rubles used under War Communism and the
first years of NEP. It was already the case during the First World War that money
had been printed when needed. During the Civil War, the Soviet government
printed money even more regularly.34 In the end, the currency that circulated was
not an effective store of value, medium of exchange or unit of account, and this
damaged the economy. Central banking functions were re-introduced with the estab-
lishment of the Gosbank (Gosudarstvennyi bank) on 3 October 1921; while it did not
copy its imperial, tsarist forerunner exactly, it was nevertheless inspired by it.
In presenting elements of the monetary reform process during 1921–24, we are
particularly interested in how prices were established in the chervonets; that is, how
what became the new ruble acquired its purchasing power. The literature on different
aspects of the monetary reform is vast.35 We have mainly based our conclusions on the
work of Sakharii S. Katzenellenbaum and Leonid N. Yurovsky who were important
economists in the 1920s with knowledge of the Soviet economy at the time.36
The main aim of the reform process was to establish a stable currency and collect
taxes in it. This would ensure that the budget could be balanced, and that the printing
of money was brought under control. Finding the right balance made it difficult to
implement the reform as a single operation, so, for example, the ‘bad old’ sovznaks
and the ‘good new’ chervonets were allowed to circulate in parallel for seventeen
months. The period of monetary parallelism lasted from early December 1922 to
the beginning of May 1924.37 The ‘exchange rate’ between the chervonets and the
sovznak was largely allowed to float. After May 1924, as some sort of prolongation
of the monetary reform process, the chervonets disappeared in favour of a new
ruble so that one chervonets became 10 new rubles.
The foreign currency exchange rate was fixed formally at the start of the mon-
etary reform process, with the new currency anchored in gold. One chervonets was
set equal to ten of the tsarist gold rubles minted from the late 1890s onwards, so
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that the pure gold (24 carat) weight of one chervonets was 119.4792 grains.38 Given
that the US dollar in the 1920s was still linked to pure gold with 23.22 grains, the
new currency received a fixed exchange rate to US dollars, and so to other curren-
cies as well. One hundred new rubles equalled 51.46 US dollars (and one hundred
US dollars equalled 194.34 rubles). Thus, for the parity value of the new ruble, 1
US dollar equalled 1.94 rubles. The official quotation included tenths of kopeks, so
that 1 US dollar was officially set equal to 1.943 rubles. Having a bad record with
money, Soviet authorities were faced with a formidable task in building confidence in
the stability of the new currency. Without re-introducing a full gold standard as part
of the process, markets for gold, dollars and pounds were established in Moscow and
other places. Thus, the public was offered an alternative to keeping their money in
rubles. The current value of the ruble was something that could be observed by
everybody. This also gave Soviet authorities the opportunity to be active in estab-
lished markets through market operations.
Over the seventeen month-long period of dual currency circulation, sovznaks con-
tinued to be printed. One reason for this was fiscal need. Over the first twelve months
of the period, the circulation of sovznaks increased by a factor of nearly 50. Of course,
this led to inflation in sovznaks. However, measured in what was paid in sovznaks for
one chervonets, the price did not increase much more than the number of sovznaks in
circulation. The full picture of sovznak circulation and the price of one chervonets over
the seventeen-month period is presented in Figure 3.39
Over the first twelve months, from December 1922 to December 1923, the price
of the chervonets increased less than 50 per cent per month. Conventionally, this has
been seen as the benchmark for moving into the domain of hyperinflation. After twelve
months, however, the monthly movement of the chervonets in sovznaks accelerated
and took on a hyperinflationary character. This was associated to a minor degree
with an increased circulation of sovznaks. That is, the hyperinflationary movement
in the price for one chervonets in sovznaks was a result of a massive loss in the com-
munity’s confidence in sovznaks.
FIGURE 3. The lower graph shows how many times the initial circulation of sovznaks increased
over the seventeen-month period (December 1922 – May 1924). Over the same period, the steeply
upward bending graph shows how many times the initial price of one chervonets in sovznaks
increased.
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Obviously, the dynamics of establishing prices and wages in new rubles was a more
difficult and dramatic part of the monetary reform process. It determined the purchas-
ing power of the new ruble. The real effective exchange rate vis-à-vis foreign curren-
cies followed as a result. In Figure 4, the path of the relative purchasing power of the
new ruble is graphically presented.40
In the summer of 1924, after the end of the monetary reform, the new ruble was
internally stabilized at a level that brought exporters, such as the timber concessio-
naires, severe difficulties. The poor purchasing power of the new ruble could have
been reinforced by deflation. This did not happen. We see from the numbers presented
in Figure 2 that the pressures were instead towards pushing prices and wages upwards.
Katzenellenbaum observes that there was ‘a considerable fall in the value of the
chervonetz’, with as much as a 40 per cent decrease over the seventeen-month
period.41 Nevertheless, over the final months of 1923 and into the first half of
1924, the value of the new currency stabilized. According to Katzenellenbaum, this
situation lasted for at least five months. Thus, Soviet authorities were inclined to see
the reform process as a success. However, one nagging question was whether the
resulting exchange rate was where it should have been. Had the rate of 1 US dollar
to 1.943 rubles led to an equivalent in rubles that was too low? It is always going to
be difficult to answer that question and to determine what should have been targeted.
Rubles under pressure: The consequences of devaluation
The purchasing power of the new ruble led to economic imbalances. People openly
discussed the insufficient purchasing power of the new Soviet currency.42 After the
end of the monetary reforms in May 1924, an import-favouring exchange rate,
together with a new, convertible and harder ruble, stimulated imports across the
Soviet Union. Exports also became less profitable. With the help of the established
foreign trade monopoly, it was possible to strike a reasonable balance in what came
in and what went out in foreign currency. However, this was not a simple task, in
FIGURE 4. The new ruble’s relative purchasing power over a seventeen- month period (December
1922 –May 1924). Based on revised price indices by Gosplan for wholesale prices (dotted line) and the
Conjuncture Institute for retail prices (solid line). Based on end-of-month numbers.
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particular due to clandestine imports along lengthy borders that were difficult to
control. The weakness of the new ruble was already being felt in 1925 and became
obvious in 1926.43 The foreign currency reserves of the Gosbank declined substantially
and something had to be done. Of course, devaluation seemed the most appropriate
action on the surface, but it was not the only possible solution given an overvalued
ruble. Alternatively, the economy could be slowed down so that prices would be
reduced. Currency regulation and control could also be introduced.44
Of course, the currency troubles must have led to deals by businessmen that would
not have happened otherwise. Typically, these kinds of deals were referred to as ‘specu-
lation’. An example of this would be selling rubles at a favourable exchange rate
because of a belief that a devaluation of the ruble was on the way. Less obviously,
rubles would also be bought if offered at a sufficiently-reduced price.
In buying considerable amounts of rubles, London & Northern Trading Co.
became engaged in speculation on an eventual devaluation of the ruble. This is well
documented in accounting records of Wm. Brandt’s Sons & Co., the City of
London bank of both London & Northern and Russnorvegoles.45 To be more specific,
at the end of 1925 and in the first half of 1926, London & Northern acquired bills of
exchange that were payable in rubles by the acceptor/drawee at maturity. Seen from
the accounting records, no actual ruble amounts are shown, meaning that the
implied exchange rate is unknown. As the drawer of the bills, London & Northern
paid the opposite contracting party up front in pounds to receive an unconditional
promise of later payments in rubles. The implied exchange rate must have been differ-
ent from the official exchange rate that was under pressure. In being discounted – that
is, sold for early payment and subsequent collection by the bank at maturity – the bills
of exchange ended up in the books of Wm. Brandt’s Sons & Co.46 Along with about
twenty separate bills of exchange of differing face values, later ruble transfers were
bought by London & Northern for a total of nearly 400,000 pounds. Most interestingly,
these bills of exchange are registered later in the books of the bank as returned; that is,
they must have been seen as unpayable. Acceptors/drawees are the London-based
Soviet controlled trading company Arcos Ltd. and Dvinoles Export Ltd.47
The period of maturity for the bills drawn up was typically up to one year.
However, before the dates of maturity were due, it became clear that the Soviet auth-
orities had opted for a step-by-step process of implementing currency regulation and
control measures. As later seen in Germany, this took the place of devaluation. The
beginning of this process came with the Decree of 9 July 1926 making the free
export of rubles illegal.48
The ruble export ban and an opening for profitable currency
deals
Unlike the German ban on both the free export and import of the Reichsmark five
years later, only the free export of the Soviet ruble was banned. Currency regulation
was a new form of economic measures, and Soviet authorities learned as they went.
Article 5 of the Soviet decree states that the ‘[e]xport and transfer of bank notes of
the State Bank of the USSR, state treasury bills of the USSR and metal coins, as
well as cheques and other payment documents issued in the USSR currency… is
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prohibited’.49 This must have come as a big surprise to London & Northern and its City
of London bank. The ruble bills drawn and discounted were unpayable by their accep-
tors, as it would have involved the export of rubles. However, if the rubles were made
available for a Western party inside the Soviet Union, they would not have been hit by
the ban of July 1926. Of course, the rubles made available would have to find a mean-
ingful use inside the Soviet Union. Russnorvegoles was an obvious candidate for this.
These currency conundrums brought London & Northern, Wm. Brandt’s Sons & Co.,
and Russnorvegoles together in devising a plan to sidestep the regulations.50 The
deficiency of first Soviet currency regulations described here, and the profitable cur-
rency deals it resulted in, have been overlooked by scholars.
As a result of the implied tripartite understanding, Russnorvegoles must have
received needed rubles that had been made available inside the Soviet Union via
deals that London & Northern initiated. A problem with this was that Russnorvegoles
had to acquire the rubles at the official exchange rate, at least officially. This was taken
care of by an arrangement of 11 October 1926 with Bernheim Blum & Co. of Berlin,
which became responsible for furnishing Russnorvegoles with rubles at the official
exchange rate.51 At the same time, contrary to the situation in 1925, Russnorvegoles
was offered an additional generous credit by their City of London bank. The financing
of current operations for 1927 was secured. For Russnorvegoles, this contributed to
the attractiveness of the tripartite understanding.
It is clear that rubles were traded unofficially below the official exchange rate. This
must also have been the case for rubles made available inside the Soviet Union. Given
that Russnorvegoles bought rubles from the Berlin bank at the official rate, this raises the
question of what happened with the difference between this rate and the unofficial rate.
Russnorvegoles bought rubles for more than double the pound amount found in bills
receivable journals of Wm. Brandt’s Sons & Co. If the unofficial rate was 25 per cent
below the official exchange rate, the net generated must have been a very impressive
amount given that the Bernheim Blum & Co. deal amounted to more than £800,000.
Rumours about dealings in currency started to circulate, most likely beginning
inside the Soviet Union. This included rumours about the physical smuggling of
pound notes into the Soviet Union and black-market operations that allowed Russnor-
vegoles to acquire cheap rubles.52 This is unlikely, and from what is documented
through later arrangements, the company was provisioned with rubles at the official
exchange rate. These, however, were rubles acquired cheaply in the West as ruble obli-
gations that later were refunded in ruble cash inside the Soviet Union. These clandes-
tine transactions from pounds to rubles came about in financial instruments more
generally, not in banknotes. Of course, given the fundamental problem of official,
expensive rubles, there was strong motivation to acquire less expensive rubles. The
rubles that we know to have passed through Quisling’s Gosbank account were most
likely of the cheaply acquired kind.53
This still leaves the question of how much of the generated net ended up with
London & Northern and how much with Prytz personally. We are not able to reconstruct
a seamless picture of what happened. Nevertheless, our sources show that two parties
benefited. First, London & Northern was able to take over most of the Western interests
in Russnorvegoles. In helping the Russian Forest Industry out of a hopeless situation, the
company’s shares in Russnorvegoles were generously paid for and taken over by London
& Northern. Then, Prytz acted as a well-paid agent for London & Northern in securing
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more shares. In the beginning of 1928, Prytz personally received a bonus of 15,000
pounds from London & Northern for his involvement, which came on top of his
already generous annual salary of about 3,000 pounds from Russnorvegoles.54
Russnorvegoles sidestepped Soviet intentions toward timer concessions on two
occasions to try to make a profit. First, in 1926, it focussed on the Soviet market.
Next, in 1927, it made currency arrangements to try to take advantage of confusing
exchange rates. The currency deals Russnorvegoles became involved in led to the
end of Western involvement in the company.
Conclusion
The Soviet authorities discovered that Russnorvegoles did not contribute foreign cur-
rency to Gosbank as was assumed. At the end of 1927, the Main Concession Commit-
tee met to discuss this problem and in early 1928 it found the exchange via Bernheim
Blum & Co. to be illegal. Russnorvegoles was even threatened with confiscation of
what were considered illicitly-acquired rubles if the practice continued.55 By now,
the Western interests had already been almost entirely taken over by London & North-
ern. The favourable ruble arrangement came to an end in the beginning of 1928. As a
consequence of this, London & Northern was forced to sell their interests in Russnor-
vegoles to the Soviet state, as represented by Severoles, at a very unfavourable price.56
It is clear that Prytz benefitted from his engagement with Russnorvegoles, and for
some years he lived off his profits. He became engaged in right-wing politics. In
Norway, the newly founded Agrarian Party (Bondepartiet) briefly caught his interest
and in 1933 Prytz was central in founding the National Union (Nasjonal Samling)
Party, the Norwegian Nazi party that was to play a controversial and tragic role in
the country’s history. He promoted the infamous Norwegian Nazi leader Vidkun Quis-
ling and Prytz became the grey eminence of the party.57 Most likely this was made poss-
ible by the proceeds of the intricate currency transactions made with Soviet rubles.
NEP included elements of amarket-based economy. Historically, however, NEPwas
only an interlude on the way to what became a command economy after 1930. This
period could be understood as the so-called time inconsistency problem of centralized
economies. That is, the tendency at one point of time to make a decision that later on
is opportunistically altered.58 Modern historical investigations of the real functioning
of command economies confirm that this was a major problem.59 The Russnorvegoles
concession, for instance, began as a long-term programme. It ended up as a short-
term experiment. The problem was unprofitability of timber exports that had to do
with the bigger question of NEP monetary reform. Most likely, the collapse of timber
concessions was an unintended consequence of this reform. Thus, what we present
can be seen as a case study that in an interesting manner documents how the Soviet
Union in its early days strived with forming coherent strategies.
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